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Chapter 1:  
1.1: Introduction  
 
 November 13th, 2015: multiple attacks in Paris leave 130 people dead and numerous 
people wounded.1 
 March 21st, 2016: an attack on Zaventem airport, Brussels, followed up by an attack on 
the metro results in 32 deaths and at least 200 wounded.2  
 December 19th, 2016: a truck drives into a Christmas Market in Berlin, killing 12 people 
and wounding another 49.3  
 March 22nd, 2017: 2 people are killed and a further 20 are wounded when a car collides 
with pedestrians on Westminster Bridge, London. The driver later stabbed an armed 
officer outside New Palace Yard.4  
 May 29, 2018: An attack in Liège Belgium, takes the lives of 2 police officers and 1 
civilian.5 
 
These terror attacks are just a few cases in the wave of terrorism currently haunting Europe. The 
number of terrorism-related deaths in Europe in 2016 was the highest for the 12 preceding years, 
when the 2004 Madrid train bombing killed 191 people and injured approximately 1800.6 Terrorism is 
by no means a recent phenomenon in Europe, and attacks have been deadlier and more devastating. 
During the 1970’s, the number of terrorism-related deaths skyrocketed as groups pertaining to the 
“New Left” (such as the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and the Italian Red Brigades), as well as separatist 
movements (such as the IRA and ETA) carried out a number of terrorist attacks.7 
                                                          
1 "Paris attacks: What happened on the night," BBC News, December 09, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994 
2 "Not again," The Economist, March 26, 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21695566-after-top-
fugitive-arrested-jihadists-strike-once-more-not-again. 
3 "Berlin lorry attack: What we know," BBC News, December 24, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
europe-38377428. 
4 Frank Kuin, "Een knal, een mes, dan schoten," NRC, June 1, 2018, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/03/22/een-
knal-een-mes-dan-schoten-7516756-a1551498. 
5 "Man Schiet Twee Agenten En Burger Dood in Luik, Justitie Vermoedt Terreurdaad," De Volkskrant, May 29, 
2018, https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/man-schiet-twee-agenten-en-burger-dood-in-luik-justitie-
vermoedt-terreurdaad~bb84dda9/. 
6 Will Chalk and Simon Maybin & Paul Brown, "Terror deaths in Western Europe at highest level since 2004 - 
BBC Newsbeat," BBC News, August 18, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsbeat/article/37085042/terror-deaths-
in-western-europe-at-highest-level-since-2004. 
7 "Terrorist atrocities in western Europe," The Economist, March 23, 2017, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/03/terrorism-timeline. 
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The following graph demonstrates the existence of two different “waves” of terrorism.8 This 
demarcation has been derived from Rapoport’s “Four waves of modern terrorism.”9  
 
Rapoport’s ‘waves’ of terrorism have been derived through an analysis of the frequency of historical 
terror attacks combined with an analysis of the characteristics of the attacks. It is essential to study 
acts of terrorism in the broader context of terrorism in order to understand what the impact of 
terrorism is on society, with the ultimate goal of achieving an understanding of the way factors in 
society subsequently impact terrorism.10  
 Rapoport labelled the wave during the second half of the 20th century as the third wave in his 
analysis, categorized as a movement countering western imperialism.11 The American struggle in 
Vietnam against the surprisingly resilient Vietcong exposed the limit of western influence abroad, 
                                                          
8 "People killed by terrorism per year in Western Europe 1970-2015." accessed June 2, 2018. 
http://www.datagraver.com/case/people-killed-by-terrorism-per-year-in-western-europe-1970-2015. 
9 David Rapoport, "Four waves of modern terrorism," in Attacking terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy 
(Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2004). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.  
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while simultaneously creating and strengthening a feeling of disgust towards western imperialism. 
Both factors in turn empowered leftist and separatist movements all over the world.12 
 Europe is currently undergoing a “fourth wave” of terrorism, labelled by Rapoport as the 
“religious wave”. Religion has always been important for terrorism, however, has proven to be more 
dominant in this wave than in the earlier ones. Historically, religious and ethnic identities combined 
have often created friction and conflict within society. The fourth wave is, however, the first wave 
wherein religion was not only grounds for conflict but proved to be important for the justification and 
organization of terrorism. Islam forms the core of this wave, as Islamic perpetrators have conducted 
the deadliest attacks, using religion to justify violence.13   
  
                                                          
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid.  
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1.2: Research puzzle & research question  
The two major differences between the “Third Wave” and the current wave of terrorism are the targets 
chosen and the support enjoyed by terrorist organizations.14 While the third wave was characterized 
by hostage-taking and the assassination of prominent figures, a potent aspect unique to the fourth 
wave is the use of suicide bombing. This method has been used extensively in Sri Lanka and in Israel, 
and has also been employed in a number of attacks in Europe.15 Another difference, as described by 
Marc Sageman, concerns the sources of support for terrorist organization as he argued that “today, 
there is no longer a formal initiation into the movement, and there is no fixed number of individuals 
who are terrorists. Rather, there are a few full-time terrorists among a pool of people sympathetic to 
their ideology. The number available to carry out acts of terrorism fluctuates according to local 
grievances and the international situation.”16 Both Rapoport and Sageman described the 
characteristics of terrorism as they were present during the publication of their respective texts on the 
topic in 2004. Rapoport described this by labelling his last wave as “the current wave” and Sageman’s 
timeframe is emphasized in the quote mentioned earlier (the text was published in 2004). These 
statements about the characteristics of terrorism can still be linked to the terrorist currently 
threatening Europe. 
 Sageman’s analysis focused on the network of Al-Qaeda influencing radicalization,17 this paper 
will argue that the radicalization process in the current wave has evolved compared to the earlier 
waves. Today, acts of terrorism – particularly in Europe - are organised in small cells, still under the 
auspices of religious fundamentalism, however, also coloured by the grievances of societal oppression 
and marginalization. It is therefore essential to understand what causes these grievances and how 
these grievances translate into radicalization in order to fully grasp the threat this wave poses to 
                                                          
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid. 
16 Marc Sageman, "Killing the Hydra," Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2004, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/jun/06/opinion/op-sageman6. 
17 Ibid. 
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European society. The importance of societal factors on the current wave of terrorism is also 
emphasized by terrorism expert Olivier Roy, whose argument is best summarized by Haaretz: “An 
estimated 60 percent of those who espouse violent jihadism in Europe are second-generation Muslims 
who have lost their connection with their country of origin and have failed to integrate into Western 
societies.”18 The last part of this quote, “… and have failed to integrate into Western societies,” 
emphasizes the importance of understanding the impact of societal factors on the process of 
integration and radicalization. This quote therefore forms the basis of this study, as it assumes that 
radicalization and extremism is subject to societal factors rather than to external influences. 
 The threat posed by the radicalization of individuals is also described by the Dutch National 
Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), which regularly publishes analyses on the level 
of the threat of terrorism. As of 2018, the threat level is ‘substantial.’ Radicalized individuals in the 
Netherlands, returnees from Syria and Iraq and jihadists from other parts of Europe can potentially 
pose a threat to Dutch society.19 This threat, as described by the NCTV20, not only endangers the 
Netherlands, but multiple European countries, as proved by the various attacks that have been 
executed in Western Europe. Understanding and preventing radicalization should therefore be the 
core of any counter-terrorism program. In order to guide the analysis within this thesis, the following 
research question is proposed: 
Why are individuals living in certain countries more prone to radicalization towards terrorism 
than others? 
It is remarkable that the Netherlands has never had to deal with a large-scale terrorist attack, 
comparable to attacks in France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. A recent report by Interpol states 
that Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom all remain high on the ISIS target 
                                                          
18 Davide Lerner, "It's not Islam that drives young Europeans to jihad, France's top terrorism expert explains," 
Haaretz, June 09, 2017, http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/.premium-
1.791954?v=FBAED08735812BD2447429DD931B773A. 
19 "Over Het Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland," Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding En 
Veiligheid, November 17, 2017, https://www.nctv.nl/organisatie/ct/dtn/over_dtn/index.aspx. 
20 Ibid.  
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list21. The Netherlands, however, seems to be not as prone to terrorism as other Western European 
countries. Only one terrorist attack has been executed (on 31th of August 2018) since 2004, and the 
individual executing the attack was not a Dutch national,22 which is in contrast to higher number of 
attacks that have been executed in, for example, Belgium23 and France.24 France, for example, has 
frequently fallen victim to terrorism. One explanation for the recurrent attacks in France is that it is 
the most active European country in Syria. The French foreign policy in Syria is aimed at the removal 
of Bashar al-Assad from power, and directly targets ISIS by launching numerous airstrikes in Syria, while 
neighbouring countries like Britain have focused on Iraq instead.25 Additionally, France has drawn 
negative attention from religious fundamentalists for cultural reasons, being a “symbol of freedom, 
enlightenment, and democratic values.”26 However, reasons like these do not explain the severity of 
terrorism in France, as this phenomenon is mostly home-grown and not merely an attack from the 
outside, as mentioned earlier27.  
 There is no alternative theory present that clarifies the difference in terms of terrorism 
between European countries. A single theory capable of explaining why certain countries are more 
prone to radicalism and terrorism than other countries is not present in the relevant literature. 
Multiple articles, however, argue that alienation from society is an important factor in the 
radicalization process. As already introduced in Olivier Roy’s aforementioned observance, this thesis 
will extensively explore theories of radicalization to postulate a possible set of explanations for the 
                                                          
21 "Changes in Modus Operandi of Islamic State (IS) Revisited," Europol, November 2016, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/changes-in-modus-operandi-of-islamic-state-revisite. 
22 Camil Driessen, "Waarom De Aanslag Op Amsterdam CS Tot Weinig Onrust Leidt," NRC, September 02, 
2018, https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/09/02/waarom-de-aanslag-op-amsterdam-cs-tot-weinig-onrust-leidt-
a1615037. 
23 Anouk Van Kampen, "Gedode Verdachte Was Marokkaan Uit Molenbeek," NRC, June 21, 2017, 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/06/22/gedode-verdachte-was-marokkaan-uit-molenbeek-11201562-a1563993. 
24 "Franse Terrorist Was Bekend Bij Autoriteiten," Reformatorisch Dagblad, March 24, 2018, 
https://www.rd.nl/vandaag/buitenland/franse-terrorist-was-bekend-bij-autoriteiten-1.1476276. 
25 "Why did ISIS target France?," OpenDemocracy, November 20, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-
europe-make-it/diego-muro/why-did-isis-target-france. 
26 Freddy Eytan, "Why Is France the Preferred Target for Terrorists?," Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs, July 
19, 2016, http://jcpa.org/article/france-preferred-target-terrorists/. 
27 Iman Amrani, "France's terrorism is largely home grown – yet both Macron and Le Pen look away," The 
Guardian. April 25, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/apr/25/france-terrorism-macron-
le-pen.  
 
 
9 
recent terrorist attacks in Europe. Societal integration and/or alienation informs the hypothesis that 
national environment has a significant influence on the radicalization process. Understanding relevant 
aspects on the state-level could shed more light on national circumstances that provide a breeding 
ground for potential radicals. This is an essential aspect in understanding why some European Muslims 
turn against their homeland, and in answering how this can be prevented in the future. The answer to 
the research question will be provided by structuring this thesis around the following sub-questions:  
1) What is the role of religion in terrorism/ radicalization?  
2) How does the radicalization process evolve?  
3) What is the impact of the national environment on the radicalization process? 
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1.3: Methodology 
Both a literature review and a comparative case study are employed in this paper. Toshkov28 
describes two scenarios where a comparative research can be of use. The first scenario is when 
research starts with a theoretically motivated research question, and with the matching hypothesis. 
The theory and hypothesis are then tested by comparing the selected cases. In the second scenario, 
the researcher asks what can be learned given the available cases, and as such starts with the case 
rather than with the theory. This research is a combination of both scenarios. The research question 
asks “why are individuals living in certain countries more prone to radicalization towards terrorism than 
others?”. This question is grounded in the significant differences between European countries, and as 
such asks the question “What can we learn from the differences between the cases?”. The first part of 
this paper offers a conceptualization and a theoretical framework that provides the paper with a 
background for analysis. This is the part of the thesis where relevant literature will be used for 
answering the first two sub-questions, forming the literature review aspect of this thesis. The relevant 
literature on radicalization then directs the research towards the hypothesis that integration and 
alienation on the national environment impacts the radicalization process. This brings us to the last 
sub-question, which asks: “What is the impact of the national environment on the radicalization 
process?”. This section tests the hypothesis by using various indicators from the radicalization model 
as described by Fathali Moghaddam. As such, this last section will sharpen the theories that are derived 
from the literature research conducted in the previous sections through the use of a comparative case 
study. 
The comparative case study used for answering the last sub question will compare some 
aspects of the national environment of the Netherlands and Belgium that could be relevant for the 
radicalization process according to Moghaddam’s analytical model. The Netherlands and Belgium are 
chosen as the cases for the research as these two cases are of best use for a most-similar cases 
                                                          
28 Dimiter Toshkov, Research Design in Political Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
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approach. The background and size of the Muslim communities in the Netherlands and Belgium are 
appropriately comparable (7,1% in the Netherlands, 7,6% in Belgium).29 Furthermore, the background 
of Muslims in Belgium and The Netherlands is similar, originally arriving as labor immigrants from 
Morocco and Turkey shortly after the end of the Second World War.30 Also, dispersion across the 
country is comparable. The highest percentage of Muslims in these two countries can be seen in 
Brussels (26%), while the Muslim communities in Rotterdam (25%) and Amsterdam (24%) is almost as 
large31.  
 On The other hand, the severity of radicalization and terrorism is significantly different in 
both countries. The number of foreign fighters that have joined ISIS is almost three times higher in 
Belgium than in the Netherlands.32 The differences and similarities between the Netherlands and 
Belgium provides a comparison that provides better insights in the aspects relevant to the 
radicalization process. Further elaboration on the case selection will be described later in this research.  
 The indicators from Moghaddam’s model on radicalization that are being used in the case 
comparison are measurable and comparable on the state-level (for example “Educational 
achievements” and “Trust in the government”). Information of this kind is often published by 
(inter)governmental institutions or academic / independent research organizations. The information 
derived from these sources will be the core of the comparison. 
As previously mentioned, comparative case study analysis provides the opportunity to test 
existing hypotheses and / or sharpen theoretical ideas. A comparative case study can be used both 
inductively (open research aiming to achieve theoretical ideas) and deductively (testing of existing 
theories/ hypotheses). A comparative research is therefore a good method of executing explorative 
                                                          
29 Conrad Hackett, "5 Facts about the Muslim Population in Europe," November 29, 2017, 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/29/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/. 
30 Milica Petrovic, “Belgium: A Country of Permanent Immigration,” Migration Policy Institute, November 15, 
2012, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/belgium-country-permanent-immigration/.  
31 Soeren Kern, "The Islamization of Belgium and the Netherlands in 2013," Gatestone Institute, accessed 
August 31, 2018, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4129/islamization-belgium-netherlands.  
32 Louisa Loveluck, "Islamic State: Where do its fighters come from?," The Telegraph, June 08, 2015, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11660487/Islamic-State-one-year-on-Where-do-its-
fighters-come-from.html. 
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research, as it broadens existing knowledge about a phenomenon while simultaneously laying out the 
groundwork for future generalizable research33. However, a comparative case study also has an 
important limitation. Selected cases are never identical, and it can therefore not be excluded that 
another variable than the ones taken into account has an effect on the differences between cases. This 
makes it practically impossible to reach conclusions on causal relations from case comparisons only.34 
It needs to be emphasized that the aim of this research is exploration, rather than with an eye of 
achieving a causal, generalizable relation between national circumstances and the radicalization 
process.  
  
                                                          
33 Dimiter Toshkov, Research Design in Political Science (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
34 Andrew Bennet, Case Study: Methods and Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
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1.5: Chapter outline  
Radicalization, terrorism and other relevant concepts are often debated and used incorrectly. 
Clarification on these concepts is therefore an essential first step in this research. The clarification of 
relevant concepts is, in turn, an introduction to theories on radicalization and terrorism. This 
conceptualization and the literature review will then be used in answering the first two sub-questions. 
The first and second sub-questions are answered theoretically. The concepts and theories described 
in the second chapter build up towards the analysis in the fourth chapter that will provide the answer 
to the last sub question, the cases used in the analysis are described in the third chapter. The answers 
to the three sub questions will be connected in the conclusion in order to answer the overarching 
research question. The conclusion will additionally describe possibilities for future research based on 
the outcomes of this paper.       
  
 14 
Chapter 2: Conceptualisation and theoretical framework 
2.1: Conceptualization 
The first part of this chapter describes the various concepts that are relevant in researching 
radicalization and terrorism. Clarification of the relevant concepts is an essential step in answering the 
research question: “why are individuals living in certain countries more prone to radicalization towards 
terrorism than others?”. This section will also use the relevant definitions and conceptualizations to 
describe the demarcation between religious and non-religious terrorism.  
2.1.1. Politicization, polarization and radicalization 
Nobody is a born radical, and religion alone does not explain why some people are inclined to commit 
religious violence. Radicalization is a process that needs to be understood and countered in order to 
prevent more attacks from occurring in Europe and beyond.35 In the following section, the concept of 
radicalization and the relevant processes of politicization and polarization will be described. 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans define the concepts of politicization and polarization, before 
continuing their analysis to describe the concept of radicalization more specifically.36 Both of these 
concepts are worth describing, as they demonstrate the processes that society as a whole is currently 
facing, those which are seen as the predecessors of radicalization. This is therefore an essential step in 
trying to understand how a specific group in society behaves (e.g. Islamic radicals or right-wing 
extremists). Politicization can be seen as the first step in the whole process of radicalization. This is 
when a group: “Intentionally engages, as a mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives 
thereof), in a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this 
struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly.”37 The definition sounds abstract, but 
                                                          
35 J van Stekelenburg and P.G. Klandermans, “Radicalization” in Identity and Participation in Culturally 
Diverse Societies. A Multidisciplinary Perspective, ed. by Assaad Azzi, Xenia Chryssochoou, Bert Klandermans, 
Bernd Simon (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 181-194. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Stekelenburg, Van, J., and P.G. Klandermans. Radicalization. 2010. 1. 
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merely describes the process whereby a conflict starts influencing society more broadly, i.e. when a 
bipolar conflict forces the population as a whole to choose sides in a conflict that was initially of limited 
size. This process is a result of the politicization of various events, resulting in a change of the relation 
between a group and the rest of society. Stekelenburg and Klandermans use the example of Islamic 
migrants in Western Europe: before 9/11 these individuals were identified by others as Dutch 
Moroccans, French Algerians, German Turks, etc. However, after 9/11 all of these individuals were 
grouped under the same identity as ‘Muslims.’ 38 
Polarization is given as the next step after politicization. As different groups are formed based 
on political affiliation, polarization consequently exacerbates the conflict between these groups, 
creating a an “us” versus “them” dichotomy. This perception can induce a perspective of the outside 
group as a threat, ultimately reinforcing these sentiments of distrust to an extent that both parties 
continue to separate themselves from one another.39  
Politicization also incites individuals into action who would otherwise have abstained from 
becoming involved in conflict. Polarization then causes the various groups to isolate themselves, which 
is an important factor in potentially driving people to commit radical political activities.40 This particular 
aspect will be analysed in depth in the later sections of this thesis. Stekelenburg and Klandermans 
perceive radicalization as the process culminating from radical political activities, however, their 
analysis lacks a definition of “radical activities”, a concept that requires clarification. Mark Sedgwich 
argues that the terms “radical”, “radicalism” and “radicalization” are more complex than often 
perceived.41 The relative meaning of the term “radical” is someone who is “representing or supporting 
an extreme section of a party”, which is a synonym for an extremist and opposes moderates.42 Standing 
in contrast with Stekelenburg and Klandermans, this approach defines radicalization as the process of 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion," Terrorism and Political Violence 
22, no. 4 (2010): 481, doi:10.1080/09546553.2010.491009. 
42 Ibid.  
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moving anywhere within the whole spectrum, i.e. from being a moderate towards being a radical, and 
thus does not require a specific action or threshold. Stekelenburg and Klandermans’ approach to 
radicalization is thus rather absolute, while Sedgwich describes it relatively. No academic consensus 
on this definition is thus present. Therefore, the definition provided by The Netherlands General 
Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) will be used in this thesis, as this definition connects academic 
conceptualization with policy usage. The AIVD uses the following criteria as a threshold necessary to 
perceive a person as a radical: “The readiness, based upon ideals inspired by politics, ethnicity or 
religion, to develop activities which, by virtue of the ends being pursued and/or the means used, does 
(or may) pose a threat to national security, and in particular to the continuity of the domestic 
democratic legal order or the international rule of law, or could seriously hinder the functioning of 
either.”43 From this perspective, in order to be perceived as ‘radical,’ an individual needs to pose a 
threat either to society or to the essential institutions of society. Radicalization is the process preceding 
this kind of danger. The definition does not specify on the threshold necessary to be considered a 
radical or radicalized, but this is also subject to the radicalization model used in analysing this process. 
Which will be described later in this paper.  
2.1.2. Religious fundamentalism, extremism, islamism & jihadism 
The concepts of Extremism, Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism are some concepts that are often 
used when describing Islamic radicalisation, but these terms are often used incorrectly. The root cause 
of the misuse of these concepts can be found in the socio-political context wherein these terms are 
frequently used. Misuse typically has negative implications on counter-terrorism efforts because it 
hinders logical analysis based on factual information. Clarification on these concepts is therefore 
essential for constructive research focussing on Islamic radicalization. The importance of the factual 
use of terms like these is emphasized by Edward Said: “fundamentalism equals Islam equals 
                                                          
43 The Netherlands, General Intelligence and Security Service, The Radical Dawa in Transition: The Rise of 
Islamic Neoradicalism in the Netherlands (The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2007), 59. 
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everything-we-must-now-fight-against.”44 This kind of oversimplification is a result of the misuse of 
important concepts by the media and the public, which leads to a variety of generalisations that in turn 
dominate any type of discussion about Islam. Emotion therefore needs to be taken out of these 
concepts in order to use the definitions factually and effectively in any type of analysis.45 The following 
figure shows the relationship between these various concepts46.  
 
 
According to Winter and Hasan, Extremism is: “A rejection of ‘balance’, and an application of a single 
ideological perspective to all elements of an individual’s life with, importantly, a fervent disdain for 
alternative ideological perspectives.”47 As the figure above exemplifies, this definition can thus be 
applied to any type of ideology. This aligns with Barry Rubin’s three-part criteria in his definition of the 
movement towards radical (Islamic) fundamentalism: 
                                                          
44 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the 
World (London: Vintage Books, 2008), xx, xix. 
45 Charlie Winter and Usama Hasan, "The Balanced Nation: Islam and the Challenges of Extremism, 
Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism," Philosophia 44, no. 3 (2015): 669, doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9634-2. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Charlie Winter and Usama Hasan, "The Balanced Nation: Islam and the Challenges of Extremism, 
Fundamentalism, Islamism and Jihadism," Philosophia 44, no. 3 (2015): 669, doi:10.1007/s11406-015-9634-2. 
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1) Islam is the answer to the problems of their society, country and region.  
2) Implementing Islam and resolving the huge problems of the peoples and states require the 
seizure and holding of power by radical Islamic groups ...  
3) The only proper interpretation of Islam is the one offered by a specific political group and its 
leaders: “the only proper interpretation of Islam is the one offered by a specific political group 
and its leaders.”48 
The first criteria particularly matches with the definition of Extremism: “Islam is the answer to the 
problems of their society, country and region.”49 The third aspect, however, is a good example of the 
difference between extremism and fundamentalism. The third criteria is the essence of 
fundamentalism, as fundamentalism rejects any type of interpretation other than the literal Islamic 
texts, in which every contextual dimension of Islam is dismissed.50 These two definitions seem to be 
contradictory, as Rubin’s definition focusses on the interpretation by a specific group, while Winter 
and Hasan emphasize that fundamentalists interpret Islamic texts in the literal sense, without taking 
context into account. However, as Winter and Hasan contend, “religion lends itself to the progression 
from extremism to fundamentalism because, put simply, it is old, and this allows for anachronistic 
understandings of its scriptures’ meanings”51. This leads to the fact that fundamentalists are often 
“among the narrowest and most ideologically guided interpreters,”52 and creates a symbiotic 
relationship between Islamic extremism and fundamentalism.53 
 The next concept, Islamism, is even more contested than fundamentalism and extremism. 
Islamic fundamentalism is often referred to as Islamism. However, extremists and fundamentalists are 
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apolitical, while Islamism is the over-politicization of Islamic fundamentalism. The misuse and 
clarification of this term is important because the perception of Islamism is often projected on 
Muslims, while in truth it is only a small part of the Muslim population that could be considered 
Islamist.  
Winter and Hasan refer to over-politicization as “the expansion of the rejectionist traits and 
solipsistic superiority apparent in extremism and fundamentalism to the political sphere of 
governance54”. This should be formulated and specified as such because a demarcation needs to be 
made between the politicization of Islam based on basic religious ideals and the politicization of 
fundamentalism based on the superiority of one specific interpretation of Islam.55 The over-
politicization of Islamic Fundamentalism is an Islamist belief that a political system based on Islam 
would help create a utopian Islamic state, the Islamic Caliphate, wherein Muslims will thrive again as 
they had done in the Islamic golden age.56  
The second criteria of Rubin’s definition - “Implementing Islam and resolving the huge 
problems of the peoples and states require the seizure and holding of power by radical Islamic groups” 
- aligns with the Islamist approach, as it attempts to solve societal problems by empowering ‘radical’ 
Islamic groups in the governance of the states. Islamism is thus significantly different than Islamic 
extremism or fundamentalism where literal interpretations of Islam are quietly and apolitically 
embedded in the community. Islamism, in turn, differs from Jihadism on the willingness to use violence 
in the pursue of this Islamic, utopian, society. Jihadism can subsequently be best summarized as “a 
violent expression of politics justified with a heavily manipulated and limited militant bibliography.”57 
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2.1.3. Terrorism 
Before clarifying the specific characteristics of and motivations of religious terrorism and radicalization, 
terrorism in general needs to be defined. As there is no universal definition of terrorism, its definition 
is the subject of academic debate. For example, the statement that “one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter”58 assumes that terrorism can never be described objectively and consistently 
and is always subject to the perspective of the descriptor.59  
 Boaz Ganor opposes this view, and argues that it is not just possible to reach an objective, 
widely shared definition, but also argues that a definition of this kind is essential in the fight against 
terrorism60. Ganor postulates a definition of terrorism with this maxim in mind, defining terrorism as 
“the intentional use of, or threat to use, violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to 
attain political aims.”61 Ganor’s definition largely overlaps with the results obtained from a study 
conducted by by Schmidt and Jongman. This analysis compared 109 definitions of terrorism and 
concluded that “use of violence” and “political goals” are the aspects most referred to in definitions. 
This indicates that these two aspects enjoy consensus in academia, while marginalizing other typical 
aspects, such as the targeting civilians. However, when all these aspects are compared with definitions 
being used by policy relevant institutes, none of these aspects are a requirement to label an attack as 
an act of terrorism, as, for example, the definition used by Europol shows: “Terrorist offences are 
intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an 
international organization when committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or 
unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing 
an act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or 
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social structures of a country or an international organization.”62 The basis of this definition is a UN 
agreement, sworn in on the 13th June 2002 in an attempt to combat terrorism. This Europol definition, 
as grounded in the UN agreement, differs from earlier stated aspects, as it focusses on the effect of 
the attack rather than on its means. This definition is also implemented in the national legislation of 
all EU Member States.63 For example, the Dutch National Coordinator for Security and 
Counterterrorism (NCTV) uses the following definition in their National Counterterrorism Strategy: 
“The perpetration of ideologically inspired acts of violence against people or of acts intended to cause 
property damage and calculated to result in social disruption, in order to undermine and destabilize 
society, create a climate of fear among the general public or influence political decision-making.”64 This 
definition is relatively similar to the one provided by Europol, however emphasizes the need for an 
“Ideologically inspired act of violence”. The definition by the NCTV thus covers the means as well as 
the effects of the attack, pertaining to both academically and governmentally agreed-upon definitions. 
Given this consensus - as well as the fact that The Netherlands is part of the analysis - makes this 
definition of terrorism the best match for the purposes of this paper.  
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2.2: Literature review  
This section will describe the radicalization process theoretically and will explain why this research 
focusses on radicalization towards terrorism rather than on specific cases on terrorism, elaborating 
the model that is being used for the analysis. The concepts that are used in the analysis are important 
factors that can be derived from the radicalization model. Therefore, the model and the concepts will 
be linked in the last section of this chapter.  
2.2.1 Causes, Ideologies and Action 
Ideologies and Religions are not a cause of violence but are capable of mobilizing populations towards 
shared objectives, functioning as a justification for certain behaviours in this pursuit. Rapoport argues 
that “most of today's Islamic terrorists see religion as a means of achieving political, economic, social, 
and security objectives, rather than as an end in itself.”65 This argument is not limited to Islamic 
terrorism, as the characteristics of (Islamic) terrorists are not fixed, instead focused on hatred for the 
status quo. Rapoport emphasizes how difficult it is to distinguish religious terrorism from ‘ordinary’ 
terrorism,66 and even argues that many Islamic fundamentalists were originally Marxists.67 The hatred 
of these terrorists remains, but the way this hatred is organized varies, depending on the political 
events of the era. This makes religious ideologies - such as fundamentalist Islam - a vehicle for the 
mobilisation of hatred.   
 The difficulty in distinguishing religious terrorism from non-religious terrorism is confirmed by 
the apparent lack of consensus on the differences between them. For example, Do Ce’u Pinto argues 
that the distinguishing characteristic of religious violence is the individual’s willingness to self-sacrifice 
in order to reach an objective.68 On the other hand, Sageman focuses on the source of support for 
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terrorism, wherein religion could provide potential recruits, as described earlier.69 Hoffman argues that 
it is the nature of violence that distinguishes religious terrorism from non-religious terrorism. 
According to Hoffman, religious terrorism causes more deaths than other forms of terrorism due to 
the use of indiscriminate violence.70   
 More consensus is, however, present on the role of religion in the recruitment of and 
radicalization towards terrorism. For example, Stewart Bell discusses the process of radicalization in 
his book The Martyr’s Oath: the Apprenticeship of a Home-Grown Terrorist, describing how a young 
Muslim had been brainwashed into violent extremism through his connection with Islam.71 Arie 
Kruglanski similarly identifies religion and nationalism as dominant motivating factors in an analysis of 
farewell videos and interviews with the relatives of terrorists killed in suicide bombings.72 In Terrorism 
in Perspective, Sue Mahan and Pamela Griset discuss a variety of motivations for terrorism, citing 
“extreme opinions and emotions regarding a belief system as the principal motivating factor behind 
the current wave of terrorism.”73 Mahan and Griset’s emphasis on extreme opinions and emotions 
highlights an important question: what it is that makes the Islamic religion the main motivator for 
contemporary terrorism? What is the cause for the diverse interpretation of the Islamic faith which for 
some manifests in a peaceful lifestyle, but for others incites violence?  
 Bernard Haykel, professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, emphasizes that 
this is due to the lack of a central religious authority shaping Islam and guiding Muslims, like, for 
example, the Vatican guiding Catholic Christians. This leads to a fragmentation of ideas within Islam 
due to the highly interpretative nature of the teachings within Islamic texts, partially explaining how 
Islam can incite individuals to commit acts of violence. However, this does not explain why certain 
people convert to violent Islam and others do not. Oliver Roy argues that the main problem is not 
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Islam, but radicalization in general. His argumentation can best be summarized by his following quote 
in Haaretz, shortly after the Manchester bombing on the 24th of May: “It’s the Islamification of 
radicalism that we need to investigate, not the radicalization of Islam.”74 The underlying argument is 
that radicalization is not driven by Islam, but Islamic extremism just happens to be the current 
dominant expression of extremism. Roy compounds his postulation by arguing that, in the past, 
extremists would have been drawn to another form of extremism, for example, towards far-left 
ideologies.75 However, this research focuses on the process of (Islamic) radicalization rather than on 
the Islamification of radicalism. The earlier mentioned contribution of Barry Rubin to the field has been 
an important factor for this decision, as Rubin provided a definition of the movement towards radical 
(Islamic) fundamentalism: 
1) Islam is the answer to the problems of their society, country and region.  
2) Implementing Islam and resolving the huge problems of the peoples and states require the 
seizure and holding of power by radical Islamic groups ...  
3) The only proper interpretation of Islam is the one offered by a specific political group and its 
leaders.76 
This contribution is especially interesting because “Islam” in this definition can be substituted by, for 
example, “communism” or “nationalism,” and can as such be applied to any form of terrorism77. This 
argument is reflected in the argument of Thomas Badey: “Perceived political, economic, social, and 
security inequities or threats and the lack of an effective ventilation mechanism, rather than 
ideologies, create conditions that lead to international political violence.”78 It is therefore essential to 
study the root causes of (Islamic) radicalisation and to achieve insights in societal unrest, as these 
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insights could be beneficial in countering radicalization and thus terrorism, remaining useful when 
Islamic terrorism may no longer the dominant terrorist threat.   
2.2.2. The radicalization process 
There have been a variety of academic contributions which have attempted to construct a model for 
the process of radicalization, including some efforts trying to answer the question of how to counter 
this problem. An essential starting point in reviewing these contributions is the famous work by Martha 
Crenshaw, who postulates several theories to explain the cause of radicalization. Crenshaw argues that 
three different levels must be taken into account when trying to understand this phenomenon: the 
individual motivations of a terrorist; the strategy of the terrorist movement; and the broader societal 
context in which the terrorist operates.79 The broader societal context forms the core of this research, 
as this is the level of research where national factors could be distinguished. Kundnani also emphasizes 
the necessity to shift focus to the societal context, arguing that most radicalization models have a 
parochial focus upon individual motives and on strategies within the terrorist organization, and as such 
neglect the broader societal context.80 Kundnani argues that the current narrative focuses solely on 
the question why individual Muslims support extremist interpretations of Islam that leads to 
violence?81 While important, as described earlier, this question only addresses part of the various 
causes of terrorism that are provided by Crenshaw. It is therefore necessary to shift focus from 
radicalization on the individual level towards a focus on the broader circumstances, the so-called “root 
causes in society,” an important aspect of the causes of terrorism.82 This perspective is shared by Mark 
Sedgwick, in his article The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion: “The concept of 
radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to some extent, the ideology and the group, and 
significantly deemphasizes the wider circumstances – the “root causes” that it became so difficult to 
talk about after 9/11, and that are still often not brought into analyses. So long as the circumstances 
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that produce Islamist radicals’ declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the 
Islamist radical will often appear as a “rebel without a cause.”83 The ‘root cause’ of terrorism therefore 
can alternatively be explained not by the religious ideology of the terrorist, but by their (perceived) 
position within society. This negative self-perception of societal status has been described in academia 
as both a “perceived feeling of injustice”84 and “relative deprivation,”85 which incite feelings of 
discrimination, marginalization or injustice in the eyes of the individual. Consequently, these feelings 
lead to a disillusionment with society and provide a fertile breeding ground for radicalization86.  
 A radicalization model that takes the social factors mentioned into account is The Staircase to 
Terrorism, as postulated by Fathali Moghaddam.87 This model is initially derived from an individual’s 
perceived feelings, but can also be related to the individuals’ (perceived) position in society. Parts of 
this model will therefore be used in analyzing state-level circumstances. Moghaddam analogizes the 
process of radicalization evolves by using the example of a staircase. According to his levelled 
description of the radicalization process, any terrorist starts at ground floor, where the level of 
perceived injustice determines whether he or she moves further up into the staircase (continues the 
radicalization process), or stays at the ground floor (abstains from radicalization). Moghaddam 
describes 5 different floors of radicalization towards the use of terrorism, and every floor is 
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characterized by a different psychological process.88. The following depiction will clarify this staircase 
metaphor89. 
 
This thesis contributes to existing literature as it connects the psychological processes as 
described by Moghaddam, to the societal context as described by Crenshaw and Kundnani. The 
indicators that can be derived from Moghaddams’ model are based on the perceived feelings of the 
individual. These perceived feelings in combination with the necessary focus on social context raises 
the question of whether the indicators that affect the perceived feelings of the individual are applicable 
to the societal conditions when explaining why certain individuals in certain countries are more prone 
to radicalization than others. This study will expand on Moghaddams’ model by connecting the position 
of the individual to the broader societal context wherein the individual becomes radicalized. This 
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contribution is necessary as most theories and analytical models focus on the individual level, whereby 
the connection between the individual circumstances and social context is not elaborated upon. 
Moghaddam describes the main motivator for a movement from ground floor to the first floor 
as one dominated by “perceptions of fairness and feelings of relative deprivation.”90 Frustration within 
society can grow when groups feel they are treated unfairly, or they are being threatened. Movement 
from ground floor to the first floor has increased considerably in recent decades, in part motivated by 
images of lavish democratic lifestyles that are being spread by mass and social media.91 This has 
created higher expectations for large parts of society in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, expectations 
which are often not realized. Disappointment then leads to increasing frustration, leading to parts of 
the population subsequently taking matters into their own hands.92 When a part of society reaches 
this point in the process then they have reached the first floor in the radicalization process. The part 
of society reaching this floor will try various options that could provide solutions for their feelings of 
unjust treatment. The critical factor on this floor is social mobility. The importance of this concept was 
already emphasized by Plato in The Republic. Plato warned that the collapse of society would occur if 
a “free circulation of individuals” was not present. This free circulation is present when talented 
civilians are offered the opportunity evolve their position in the social hierarchy, and correspondingly 
by the necessity of untalented individuals, who somehow have gained a high position in society, to 
lose status in the social hierarchy.93 If people see no possibilities to improve their position in society 
then this makes them more likely to climb further up the staircase towards the second floor.  
The second floor is subsequently characterized by more aggressive feelings of injustice, as 
frustration turns to anger. This state of mind facilitates the most important transformation in the 
radicalization process, which is a gradual movement towards the acceptance of the morality of 
terrorist organizations.  
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The third floor is one stage in this gradual movement. This is when aggression turns into moral 
engagement as potential recruits are being committed to the morality of a terrorist organization. As 
Moghaddam contends, this level is where “potential terrorists find themselves engaged in the 
extremist morality of isolated, secretive organizations dedicated to changing the world by any means 
available to them.”94 From this moment the only steps left before becoming a terrorist is recruitment 
by an organization on the fourth floor, and the execution of an attack on the fifth floor.  
This analysis will, however, only focus on the process that occurs before any (potential) radical 
reaches the third floor. The argument behind this focus is threefold. Firstly, executing a terrorist attack 
or joining a terrorist organization is not the first threshold necessary in order to be perceived as a 
radical. The mere perception of terrorism as a moral practice on the second floor makes individuals a 
potential threat for national security. This is also in line with the earlier definition of a radical, being 
someone opposing a moderate. Secondly, recruitment by a terrorist organization and preparing the 
attack are only limited barriers for being a deadly terrorist, as new kinds of terrorism can strike 
anywhere, anytime, and seemingly without a known origin. For example, a vehicle ramming attack, as 
demonstrated by the attack in Berlin on the 19th of December 2016, could be executed by any 
aggressor without much preparation or links to terrorist organizations.95 Lastly, only the first two floors 
in the radicalization process address the root causes of terrorism. The factors that are relevant on the 
first two levels are part of social, comparable circumstances on the state level. The “ventilation 
mechanisms in society,”96 as described earlier by Badey, are influential on the first and second floor, 
while the latter three floors only address individual aspects and the influence of terrorist organizations. 
National circumstances on these levels are less important, as at this point individuals have already 
distanced themselves from alternative solutions that could ease their perceived feelings of injustice. 
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Focusing on the first two floors of the radicalization process thus provides the opportunity to reach 
conclusions about the radicalization process that are applicable to social circumstances on the national 
level. Including the third, fourth and the fifth floor will only make a comparison on state level more 
complex as these floors focus too much on specific cases of terrorism. The factors relevant in moving 
up in the first two floors will thus be used as concepts in this analysis. The relation between the model 
and these concepts chosen will be described in the next section. 
2.2.3. Indicators 
As previously mentioned, “Feelings of injustice” are a critical factor in the movement from ground floor 
to the first floor. In his model of social inequality, Garry Runciman describes two concepts that can be 
distinguished regarding these feelings of injustice: fraternal deprivation and egoistical deprivation.97 
Egotistical deprivation occurs when an individual feels deprived within a group, whereas fraternal 
deprivation occurs when an individual, recognized externally as being part of a group, feels deprived 
because s/he is part of this group. The impact of fraternal deprivation on radicalization is especially 
high, in contrast with egoistical deprivation.98 Therefore, whenever a society is politicized and 
polarized, the risk of the marginalized group becoming radicalized is elevated.99 This argumentation 
leads to the first two concepts of analysis: Islamophobia within society and Religious freedom. 
Personal mobilization is the essential factor in the second step in the radicalization process. If 
the individual has the ability to mobilize independently, then they are also more likely to develop 
terrorist independently, instead of being frustrated because they feel left behind. The perceived 
possibilities for mobilization are partly determined by, again, a feeling of discrimination. However, if 
the possibility is present to access proper education and/or subsequently access the job market on a 
level that matches the individual’s talent, then individuals enjoy a sufficient level of social mobility. If 
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this is not possible due to, for example, additional social barriers for Muslims, then this will have a 
negative impact on personal mobilization and could thus have a catalytic effect on the radicalization 
process. This bring us to the third concept of analysis: Education & Labor. 
Another option that, when available, significantly decreases an individual’s tendency to 
commit non-normative actions is trust in the government and the availability to participate in 
democracy. Tyler and Huo conceptualized this feeling of fairness as procedural justice, in their words, 
“how fair people see the decision-making process to be.”100 In an equal and just society, when an 
individual feels justly threated by the authorities, they would have the opportunity to influence 
decision making. If this is not the case, then the perception of institutional injustice will materialize, 
subsequently having an impact on their positive or negative participation in society.101 The perception 
that individuals have of the authorities is therefore another important factor in the radicalization 
process. This factor provides us with the last two concepts that will be used in the analysis: Trust in the 
government & Participation in decision making.  
2.2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter elaborated various aspects of radicalization and terrorism that that have been the subject 
of recent academic debate. This led to a description of and a focus on the process of radicalization. 
The current literature often focuses on individual aspects, without necessarily linking these aspects to 
social context. This study aims to forge this link by relating this perception to the social context. The 
next chapters will elaborate the countries chosen for the comparison and will use the indicators 
derived from Moghaddam’s analytical order in the case comparison.  
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Chapter 3: Comparison on variations within Europe  
This chapter provides information on terrorist activity (the numbers of arrests, attacks, deaths & 
foreign fighters) in Europe. This chapter contributes to the overall analysis of this thesis, as it elaborates 
the differences between European countries regarding these phenomena and on (the background of) 
the Muslim population. The background of the Muslim population is important to consider for the case 
selection. This section aims to find cases that have significant differences on terrorist activity but are 
simultaneously comparable in other aspects. Finding cases that have a comparable Muslim population 
is therefore essential in constructing a case comparison analysis. This information leads to the 
clarification of the decision made for the cases mentioned earlier (the Netherlands and Belgium). 
3.1. Terrorist offences in the EU 
Terrorism offences in the European Union peaked after the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015. The number 
of deaths resulting from terrorism influenced by religious fundamentalism significantly increased from 
four deaths in 2014 to 150 deaths in 2015. The deaths caused by terrorist offences has declined since 
(62 deaths in 2017), however, terrorist activity has remained equal (arrests) or has increased (attacks), 
as the following figure illustrates.102  
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The explanation behind the paradox of the rising number of attacks despite a declining number of 
deaths is twofold. The attacks in 2017 were often less sophisticated compared to those in 2015 and 
2016, and police and intelligence units are now better prepared than they were when terrorist offences 
had just seen a significant increase.103 However, the rising number of attacks and the stable number of 
arrests emphasizes that the root causes of terrorism have not yet been tackled. The number of arrests 
and attacks per country also shows the significant variation between different countries, as the 
following figure shows.104 
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The figure above clearly shows that France and in the UK have experienced a higher level of terrorism-
related arrests compared to arrests in the rest of the European Union. However, these numbers need 
to put into context before (radicalization towards) terrorism between European countries can be 
compared, as multiple factors affect these numbers. When an individual has reached the end of the 
radicalization process, they find themselves in one of three outcomes: the individual gets arrested; the 
individual executes an attack; or the individual leaves Europe to fight elsewhere. The differences 
between European countries on the last option is illustrated in the next figure.105 
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The different statistics show significant variations between European countries. This is, however, not 
enough information to draw comparisons between countries, as variations between countries are 
impacted by the efficiency of respective law enforcement agencies,106 the percentage (of the total 
population), and the background of the Muslim population. Therefore, the profiles of western 
European countries with a significant number of Muslims living within their borders will be analysed in 
the following section.  
3.2. Islam in Europe 
I will describe the size and the background of the Muslim population of Western European countries 
that have a significant Muslim population107. The highest category from the following figure will form 
the selection for this description, in a first attempt to limit differences between countries on the Islamic 
population, the threshold will therefore be 6% of the total population. The background of the Muslim 
population of the following countries will therefore be described briefly: Sweden, UK, Netherlands, 
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Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France. Bulgaria is excluded from this comparison as it 
cannot be considered a Western European country, and has a significantly higher percentage of 
Muslims than other countries, which would complexify a case comparison with other countries 
described in this section. The figure below108 is a measurement from 2016, taken during the refugee 
crisis when Western European countries witnessed an influx of Islamic immigrants and asylum seekers. 
The factual size of the Muslim population would therefore be bigger than the numbers presented.  
 
                                                          
108 Ibid. 
 37 
3.2.1. Sweden 
In 2007, Sweden had an estimated Muslim population of 250,000 to 350,000 (respectively 1,8% to 
4,4% of the total population). The research above estimates the percentage of Muslims in 2016 as 8,1% 
of the total population in Sweden. The Islamic population thus has sharply increased in the past 
decade.  
 The most common country of origin for Swedish Muslims is Turkey. The Turkish population 
constitutes 10% of the Swedish Muslim population and enjoys the most political influence in the group. 
The second largest group is comprised of Iranian Muslims, followed by Iraqis (mostly Kurds) and 
Lebanese. The remaining groups are of various origins, including Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and 
Palestine.109 The statistics have been derived from research conducted in 2007. Sweden has seen two 
big waves of migrants in the 21th century, one wave from 2004-2012 and another refugee influx that 
has been ongoing since 2015. Syrian and Afghan migrants made up the largest share in these 
influxes.110  
3.2.2. The United Kingdom 
The majority of the Islamic population in the UK are of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, while other 
large groups are of East African origin, mostly from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Large-scale migration 
to the UK from these countries can be attributed to decolonization and labour shortages in the post-
World War II era.111 Multiple smaller groups of migrants arrived in the UK in the second half of the 20th 
century, mostly as refugees and asylum seekers.112 The origins of the Muslim population per country 
is illustrated in the following figure.113  
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3.2.3. The Netherlands and Belgium 
The Netherlands and Belgium have, as mentioned, a relatively similar Muslim population. The 
background (labor immigrants from Morocco and Turkey, coming to both Belgium and the Netherlands 
shortly after the Second World War) and size (7,1% in the Netherlands, 7,6% in Belgium) of the Muslim 
communities in the Netherlands and Belgium are also comparable.114115 Also, dispersion across the 
country is comparable. The highest percentage of Muslims in these two countries can be seen in 
Brussels (26%), while the Muslim communities in Rotterdam (25%) and Amsterdam (24%) are 
comparatively almost as large.116 
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 3.2.4. Germany 
Germany has the second-largest Muslim population in Western Europe behind France. Turkish guest 
workers arrived in the 1950’s and 60’s, causing a major influx of Muslims in the 20th century.117 German 
Muslims are predominantly of Turkish origin, as the following figure illustrates.118 Germany also 
experienced a major influx of Muslims during the refugee crisis, with large numbers of Syrian refugees 
enlarging the factual share of Muslims with Middle Eastern origins.119 
 
3.2.5. Austria 
The biggest Muslim group in Austria is of Turkish origin, followed groups of Muslim of Bosnian origins 
and multiple smaller groups from other Eastern European countries and Middle-Eastern countries. A 
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big influx of Muslims arrived as “guest workers” after 1964, while another big wave arrived in the 1990s 
originating from Yugoslavia.120 The current refugee crisis has also contributed to the increasing Muslim 
population in Austria.121 The Muslim population has additionally sharply risen in the last decades as a 
result of the willingness of Muslims to speak publicly about their religion has grown significantly, 
especially for Turkish Muslims.122  
3.2.6. Switzerland 
The Islamic population in Switzerland stands in contrast with the Muslim population of most other 
European countries. Swiss Muslims are primarily from other European countries, mostly from Eastern 
European countries. The biggest influx began in the 1960s and has continued up until today, attributed 
to the large number of politically-driven asylum seekers. The Muslim population has grown steadily 
and consistently since the 1960’s.123  
3.2.7. France 
A lack of consensus exists on the exact size of the Islamic population in France, but different sources 
confirm that France has the biggest Islamic population of all Western European countries.124125 The 
biggest influx of migrants arrived in France after WWII. The post-war European economic boom 
created demand for labour migrants, while this period in history coincided with the decolonization of 
the French colonies in Northern Africa, making Muslims with origins from Northern Africa the biggest 
group of French Muslims. The biggest subgroup are the Muslims from Algerian origins, followed by 
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Muslims from Moroccan and Algerian origins.126 Furthermore, the increased Muslim population in 
France can also be attributed to other waves of migration, to the refugee crisis and to the natural 
growth of the endogenous Islamic population.127  
3.3. Conclusion 
This section has shown differences in the amount of terrorist activities and on the background of the 
Islamic population between various European countries. Comparisons have been drawn between 
countries to enable further analysis on radicalization in a case comparison. The country profiles have 
shown significant variations between countries on the size and the background of the Muslim 
population. The only countries that have a comparable Islamic populations are the Netherlands and 
Belgium, however, these two countries vary significantly in terms of terrorist activity. The amount of 
foreign fighters coming to Belgium is more than triple the amount in the Netherlands. 35 arrests and 
0 attacks have taken place in the Netherlands compared to 50 arrests and 2 attacks in Belgium (in 2017, 
with a total population of 17,1 million inhabitants in the Netherlands and 11,3 million in Belgium).128 
These differences and similarities make the Netherlands and Belgium the best fit for the case 
comparison in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
4.2.1. Religious freedom  
The right for anybody to practice their religion of choice is a fundamental right in the constitution of 
both the Netherlands129 and Belgium.130 The question is, however, how this right is actively promoted 
by the government. A success or failure in defending this right is essential for an individual’s perceived 
threat to his/her identity, as this could incite feelings of inequality, which, as mentioned earlier, is an 
essential factor in the radicalization process. The first factor that will be used to measure the degree 
to which the Islamic religion is accepted and supported by these governments is the provision of 
funding to religious groups. When funding more easily available to, for example, Christian institutions 
than it is for Islamic institutions, this could easily be perceived as unjust for the Islamic population. This 
is therefore a good indicator for analyzing the acceptance of Islam within society. A second indicator 
is the restriction of the Burka or Hijab. Restrictions on religious symbols could be perceived as a limiting 
factor of religious freedom, which in turn can be perceived as an unjust and offensive treatment for 
the Islamic population.  
4.2.1.1. Government Funding  
The Belgian government supports religious freedom by funding religious institutions, including 
Mosques. Government funding for all religions supports the notion of equality in society. In order to 
receive funding, individual Mosques need to be recognized, which is not always the case.131 
Approximately 328 mosques exist in Belgium and only 73 receive government funding.132 The reason 
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for this is two-fold: (1) receiving governmental subsidies is a long and bureaucratic process; and (2) 
this process is subject to strict regulations. The complexity of attracting funding for Islamic institutions 
is exemplified in the Belgian region of Flanders, where Protestant Christian institutions get more 
funding than Islamic institutions, despite there being three times more Muslims than Protestants in 
the region.133 Various requirements for all mosques in Flanders exist, for example: the use of the Dutch 
language, the obligation to welcome both homosexuals and women and abstain from preaching 
extremism134.  
 The Netherlands, on the other hand, has a much more simplified system for requesting 
government funding. Requesting funding for religious practice generally occurs without much 
difficulty, as long as the religion is officially recognized, which is the case for Islam.135 No information 
about the exact amount of mosques receiving funding is currently available, however, only 13% of 
Dutch municipalities have specific rules for this type of funding.136 One Dutch newspaper even argues 
that the current policy leans toward a notion of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell,’ i.e. government organs are 
reluctant to investigate practices in mosques for fear of raising conflict over sensitive subjects.137  
4.2.1.2. Restrictions on the hijab/ burka 
Restrictions on using both the hijab and the burka have caused commotion both in the Netherlands 
and in Belgium. In 2010, Belgium was the first European country to ban the burka in public spaces in 
2010.138 The Netherlands adapted similar legislation in 2016, partly caused by the then relatively 
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powerful position of far-right politician Geert Wilders.139 Wearing the hijab is not restricted by national 
law, but the European Court of Justice determined in 2016 that it is allowed to prohibit wearing a hijab 
when neutrality is necessary for someone’s functioning, for example if the individual was a member of 
the police force.140 It has been argued that laws prohibiting wearing a burka or hijab would undermine 
the fundamental right to the freedom to practice religion.141 However, no differences on the influence 
of the laws exist between the Netherlands and Belgium, and therefore no differences in the impact on 
Muslims is derived from this restriction. This is an important notion nonetheless, as national and 
European legislation on the burka has generated anger within Islamic populations142. It is therefore 
important to underscore what the approach of both countries is, despite a lack of ostensible 
differences.  
4.2.2: Islamophobia in society 
When the fear or hatred of Islam is deeply rooted in society, the chances of individuals becoming 
radicalized increase. Feels of discrimination can polarize the in- and out-group, which in turn further 
alienates Muslims from society. When people of a specific religion feel deprived as a group, either 
because of social exclusion or by economic disadvantages, they may lean further toward 
radicalization.143 In this section, the social as well as the economic position of Muslims will be 
compared as these two aspects are closely interconnected.144 The European Commission regularly 
publishes a report about discrimination in the EU. The most recent report was published 2015, and 
analyzed both the experienced levels of discrimination and public opinion towards different groups. 
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The analysis on experienced levels of discriminations does, unfortunately, not specify the experiences 
of discrimination per group or religion, but only perceived feelings of religious or ethnic discrimination 
in general. In both the Netherlands and Belgium, 3% of the population feel they have been victim to 
discrimination on religious grounds.145 The Netherlands scored better than Belgium in terms of 
discrimination based on ethnic grounds, as 2% felt discriminated on ethnic grounds in the former and 
4% in the latter.146 However, the differences become clearer when comparing personal attitudes 
towards specific groups. In a survey, two questions were asked regarding religious prejudice: firstly, 
participants were asked how comfortable they would feel if one of their children was in a loving 
relationship with either a Christian, Atheist, Jew, Buddhist or Muslim. While 47% of the Belgian 
respondents answered they would be comfortable or indifferent to their child being in a relationship 
with a Muslim, the average score for the other four groups was 75%. The Netherlands scored better 
on this question, with 57% of the respondents being comfortable with or indifferent about this 
situation with a Muslim. The average score on this same question regarding the other groups in the 
Netherlands was 83% feeling comfortable or indifferent. Comfort rates towards Muslims thus scored 
28% lower in Belgium and 26% lower in the Netherlands than the average for the other groups. The 
gap between comfort rates regarding Muslim groups when compared with other groups is important, 
as it indicates general attitudes towards these groups in relation to other religions. 
 The second question yielded similar results. This question asked if respondents were 
comfortable working in a professional capacity with a Jew, Muslim, Buddhist or Christian. 69% of 
Belgian and 85% of Dutch respondents reported that they would be ‘comfortable’ or ‘indifferent’ 
working alongside a Muslim, while an average of 86.75% in Belgium and 93.5% in the Netherlands 
responded similarly with regard to the other groups. The difference between comfort rates in Belgium 
is twice as large as that of the Netherlands, standing at 17.75% and 8.5% respectively, suggesting that 
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the attitudes towards Muslims are worse in Belgium than in the Netherlands.147 This begs the question: 
can these negative attitudes towards Muslims be interpreted to demonstrate that Muslims on average 
are marginalized in society? To answer this, the differences between educational and economic 
achievements of Muslims in the Netherlands and Belgium will be discussed in the next section.  
4.2.3: Labor & Education 
If an individual feels discriminated in the job market, or feels limited in his or her capabilities to move 
up the societal hierarchy because s/he is part of a certain group, then this will most likely fuel feelings 
of injustice, which is an essential factor in Moghaddam’s model for potential radicalization.148 
Additionally, a failure to participate in the job market or restrictions on education will affect the 
economic position of certain groups in society, which will also directly affect a person’s social mobility. 
The possibilities increasing and the barriers limiting social mobility will be analysed and compared in 
this section. This will be done through the use of two indicators: Labor market participation and 
educational achievements. 
4.2.3.1. Labor market participation 
A comparison on levels of (un)employment comes with multiple complications, most importantly 
regarding the concepts used in the comparison, as government institutions almost only analyze the 
position of migrants, not Muslims. For example, the Dutch Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) uses the 
term migrant in all their analyses about employment and education. They define a migrant as someone 
who is born abroad (first-generation migrant) or has at least one parent born abroad (second-
generation migrant). A Muslim with both parents born in the Netherlands is thus not included in these 
statistics, and no statistics are available regarding the employment of Muslims in general. Additionally, 
being a migrant does not provide any information regarding the duration an individual has been living 
in the Netherlands, nor about his/her quality of immigration. Therefore, high unemployment among 
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migrants can be caused by myriad factors, for example, not being able to speak the local language. This 
complicates the relationship between the (un)employment of Muslims and the presence of prejudices 
or discrimination against Muslims.149  
 What would be edifying in this case would be to compare statistics revealing levels of tolerance 
of foreigners in the Netherlands and Belgium. If the gap between migrants and non-migrants is much 
bigger in one of the two countries, then this could indicate that more problems exist regarding the 
integration process in one of these countries than the other.  
 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regularly publishes 
data on unemployment rates on native- and foreign-born residents. This provides a good comparison 
between the Netherlands and Belgium as the same definition (persons ages 15-64, searching for a job 
and taking active steps to find a job) is used for both countries.150 However, only first-generation 
migrants are taken into account and the unemployment rate does not distinguish between various 
groups of migrants, presenting a limitation which should be taken into account when formulating 
conclusions based on the data provided.  
 Netherlands scores better in this comparison as both absolute unemployment rates and on 
the relative position of foreigners. The Netherlands has a 4.3% and 8.9% unemployment rate 
respectively for natives151 and foreigners,152 which makes the unemployment rates among foreigners 
5.8% higher. Belgium has a comparable unemployment rate for natives standing at 5.7%153, however 
scores much higher on unemployment for foreigners, which stands at 13.4%.154 This makes the gap 
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between natives and foreigners 7.7%, which is significantly higher than the percentual gap in the 
Netherlands (4.6%). 
 There are no detailed statistics available on unemployment, for example, statistics 
demonstrating why certain people fail to find a job, or on the severity of discrimination on the job 
market. But the statistics of unemployment among migrants does prove that discrimination happens 
in both countries, and also emphasizes that there are significant differences between the job market 
in Netherlands and in Belgium. As said, these statistics only describe the situation of foreign-born 
immigrants. It is therefore worth analyzing if similar differences between the Netherlands and Belgium 
exist regarding educational achievement, as this could influence current and future unemployment 
rates.  
4.2.3.2. Educational achievements  
The proportion of Muslims per level of education differs significantly between the Netherlands and 
Belgium, as shown in tables below.155156 When using the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED), , the percentage of individuals holding a certificate of higher education in the 
Netherlands is higher among the Muslim population (31%) than the non-Muslim population (20%).157 
A high level of education in this classification can be perceived as academic or vocational tertiary 
education or via the completion of an advanced research program. Medium education is equivalent to 
upper-secondary education or post-secondary non-tertiary education. Any type of education less than 
upper secondary education is categorized as a low educational level.158  
 In Belgium, the percentage of Muslims with higher education qualifications is almost half that 
of the non-Muslim population (23% non-Muslims achieving high education, compared to 12% of 
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Muslims).159 The proportion of Muslims achieving only lower level education is also higher in Belgium, 
with 65% compared to 50% in the Netherlands. The differences between the Netherlands and Belgium 
are thus significant, suggesting that Belgian Muslims enjoy a higher educational position than Muslims 
in the Netherlands. However, it has to be noted that these statistics are derived from an analysis 
performed in 2005. This is important nonetheless, as the job perspective of the generation of 2005 
could still be of impact to the current position of Muslims in society.  
The Netherlands High Medium Low 
Muslim 31% 19% 50% 
Non-Muslim 20% 40% 41% 
Indeterminate 33% 27% 41% 
 
Belgium High Medium Low 
Muslim 12% 23% 65% 
Non-Muslim 23% 30% 47% 
Indeterminate 43% 31% 26% 
 
While there is a lack of contemporary research comparing these statistics, research conducted by the 
OECD in 2015 suggests that having a migrant background in Belgian society had a considerable impact 
on educational achievements. This is emphasized in Education and Training Monitor 2017. The country 
profile on Belgium, published by the European Commission, argued that the “low performance of 
pupils with a migrant background is a concern.160” This argument is derived from the PISA research 
analysed in 2015. This research concluded that despite the fact that the position of immigrant students 
in Belgium improving since 2006, it does not yet equal the OECD average.161 The same indicator derived 
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from the same research analysed that the position of immigrant students in the Netherlands equals 
the OECD average, but has been stable since 2006.162 It can therefore be concluded that Belgian 
migrants, and Muslims more specifically, often fail to achieve the same level of education as non-
migrants/ non-Muslims. The position of Muslims as measured by this indicator is worse in Belgium 
than it is in the Netherlands. This could fuel feelings of injustice and could thus catalyse radicalization. 
4.2.4: Procedural justice.  
The last concept in this comparison is Procedural Justice, which describes “how fair people see the 
decision-making process to be.”163 If people perceive the decision making to be unfair, then could 
frustration and radicalization can be fueled. However, simultaneously, this same factor can also be a 
ventilation mechanism preventing further escalation. If people feel unfairly positioned in society, 
however simultaneously have trust in the government and/ or have the possibility to influence it, then 
this will have a positive impact, as it keeps options other than further radicalization open. This concept 
will thus be analyzed by the indicators ‘trust in the government’ and ‘possibilities for participation in 
decision making.’ 
4.2.4.1: Trust in the government 
The information available regarding public trust in political institutions among the Islamic population 
in the Netherlands and in Belgium is limited.  
 CBS reports that Muslims in the Netherlands have the most trust in the judges (74%) but often 
distrust the police (62% distrust) and the army (53% distrust). The trust in the parliament falls 
somewhere in between, 40% of the Dutch Muslims say to trust the Dutch parliament.164 No statistics 
are available regarding the levels of trust of Muslims in Belgium have of governmental institutions. The 
only available source describes the trust of Turkish and Moroccan Belgians from Brussels and Antwerp 
                                                          
162 "Compare Your Country - PISA 2015. Netherlands," OECD, accessed September 03, 2018, 
http://www.compareyourcountry.org/pisa/country/nld?lg=en. 
163 Tom Tyler and Yuen Huo, Trust in the Law (New York: Russell Sage Foundation). 
164 Judit Arends and Hans Schmeets. “Sociaal en institutioneel vertrouwen in Nederland,” CBS, January 2015, 
https://www.cbs.nl/NR/rdonlyres/D412FF72-0AD7-40B3-AE78- 
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in the Government and in Parliament. 165 According to these statistics, 34% of the Turkish Belgians and 
44% of the Moroccan Belgians have little or no trust in the parliament.166 Additionally, 37% of the 
Turkish Belgians and 42% of the Moroccan Belgians have little or no trust the government.167  
A relatively similar report from Netherlands explores results from a survey taken from Dutch 
individuals identifying as Turkish and Moroccan, asking if they agree or disagree with the statement: 
“I trust the Dutch political System.” 40% of Turkish and 31% of Moroccans respondents disagreed.168 
Evidently, differences between the Netherlands and Belgium in this study are hard to distinguish. This 
is partially caused by the lack of comparable information, along with the fact that the information that 
has been presented not showing significant variations between the Netherlands and Belgium. 
4.2.4.2: Possibilities for participation in decision-making 
Both the Netherlands and Belgium are democracies, offering the possibility to join (joining the political 
arena) and passive (voting) influence in the political system. This has led to the presence of Muslim 
representatives in the governments and parliaments of both countries. The website Democracy 
Barometer provides an index of various factors relevant for the functioning of a democracy, from which 
each country Is given a score for the prevalence of democratic values in society. One of these factors 
is the aspect of equality, defined as follows: “Particularly understood as political equality - means that 
all citizens are treated as equals in the political process, have equal rights to influence decision-making 
and have equal access to political power.”169As the following graphs demonstrate, the Netherlands and 
Belgium score similarly according to the index: 
                                                          
165 Marc Swyngedouw et al., “Politieke Participatie van Turkse en Marokkaanse Belgen in Antwerpen en 
Brussel”, Dienst Sociale Netwerken, accessed on 18 October, 2018. http://docplayer.nl/14547591-Politieke-
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166 Ibid.  
167 Ibid. 
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169 "Country profile: Netherlands," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, 
http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Netherlands.html. 
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Equality in Belgium170 
 
Equality in the Netherlands171 
 
When comparing country profiles based not just on the measured value of equality but on the 
democracy score in general, the Netherlands scores significantly higher than Belgium. This concept 
                                                          
170 "Country profile: Belgium," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, 
http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Belgium.html. 
171 "Country profile: Netherlands," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, 
http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Netherlands.html. 
 53 
takes into account values of freedom, equality and opportunities for control into account, informing 
the following country profiles: 
Quality of Democracy in Belgium172 
 
Quality of Democracy in The Netherlands173 
 
The democracy quality score in the Netherlands is significantly higher than that of Belgium. The 
differences between the Netherlands and Belgium are thus significant when the other aspects of 
                                                          
172 "Country profile: Belgium," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, 
http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Belgium.html. 
173 "Country profile: Netherlands," Democracy Barometer, accessed September 05, 2018, 
http://www.democracybarometer.org/profileEN_Netherlands.html. 
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democracy are taken into account. Taking a closer look at the various values, the Netherlands scores 
higher on levels of freedom than Belgium. Freedom describes the individual liberties (“inviolability of 
the private sphere174), the rule of law (“designates the independence, the primacy, and the absolute 
warrant of and by the law. This requires equality before the law and a good quality of the legal 
system2175) and the public sphere (“the right to take part with others in expressing opinions and 
seeking to persuade and mobilise support. This is ensured by the freedom of association and the 
freedom of opinion”176). The Netherlands scores especially high on individual liberties when compared 
to Belgium, as clarified by the graph below.  
Level of Freedom in Belgium177
 
Level of Freedom in The Netherlands178 
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The importance of these individual liberties can easily be linked to the concept of procedural justice, 
as a high degree of individual liberties could limit an individual’s fear for an intrusive government while 
simultaneously ensuring other rights that can be relevant, for example, religious freedom. The 
difference on this indicator is therefore worth taking into account when comparing these two 
countries.  
4.3: Conclusion 
This analysis has drawn a comparison between the Netherlands and Belgium on five different 
indicators: Islamophobia within society, Religious freedom, Education & Labor, Trust in the government 
& Participation in decision making. The Netherlands proved to score more inclusive, fair, or equal on 
all aspects where significant differences between the Netherlands and Belgium could be indicated. This 
is exemplified by differences in terms of Islamophobia in society (the gap in comfort rates is twice as 
high in Belgium as in the Netherlands) and on the educational achievements (significantly higher rates 
of Muslims with a high education in the Netherlands than in Belgium). 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The goal of this research was to answer the question: “why are individuals in certain countries more 
prone to radicalization towards terrorism than others?” This question is pertinent as various European 
countries have recently become victim to terrorism, however, the variations in terrorist activities in 
different countries are significant. For example, France has been a frequent victim of terrorism, while 
the Netherlands experienced its first terror attack (since the refugee crisis) only in 2018. Relevant 
literature on terrorism and radicalization suggested that a focus on radicalization rather than on the 
occurrence of terrorist offences would contribute toward closing the literature gap on this subject. The 
answer to the first sub question can be seen as the reason behind the focus on radicalization.  
 The first sub question regards the role of religion is in terrorism and radicalization 
radicalization. This role is perfectly summarized by aforementioned quote by Badey: “Perceived 
political, economic, social, and security inequities or threats and the lack of an effective ventilation 
mechanism, rather than ideologies, create conditions that lead to international political violence.”179 
Ideologies, and religion subsequently play a role in (radicalization) towards terrorism, but this is not 
the root cause of radicalization. Rather, Islamic extremism just happens to be the current dominant 
expression of extremism.180 This argument concludes that although religion affects the character of 
radicalization and terrorism, it is not a root cause of the phenomenon.    
 The second sub question refers to the evolution of the radicalization process. This refers to the 
actual “root cause” of terrorism, and the following steps that are taken in this process. Relevant 
literature on terrorism mostly focuses on activity either on the individual level or on the level of 
terrorist groups, lacking analysis of the societal context that has influence on the process. This research 
aims to narrow that gap by relating the individual motives to the societal context. Moghaddam’s 
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analytical model provided the staircase analogy that has been applied to a case comparison in this 
study. This comparison used various indicators from the staircase model in the analysis. The analysis 
then proved to match with the hypothesis that the national environment has a significant influence on 
the radicalization process, and in doing so provided the answer for the last question, asking what the 
impact of the national environment is on the radicalization process? The impact of the national 
environment appears to be significant, as we would expect to see that Belgium scores worse on the 
various indicators considering the fact that more terrorist activity has occurred in Belgium. This proved 
to be the case on almost all factors analysed. The research question can thus be answered as the 
analytical model appears to be applicable to societies rather than only to individuals, which allows us 
to conclude that an inclusive, fair and equal society will limit terrorism by addressing its root causes. 
However, as mentioned above, the conducted research comes with some limitations. The most 
important aspect is that should be read as an explorative research on the relation between multiple 
complex factors that influence the radicalization process. The impact of multiple social factors has been 
clarified, however, multiple questions on other pressing issues remain, as some factors have been left 
out of this analysis. This conclusion, for example, raises the question of why social environment differs 
between countries. How did this develop into its current form and how can we influence these 
circumstances in order to (further) take away the root causes for radicalization?  
Another addition that could be made in order to improve the quality of this research could be 
a broadening of the case comparison. The choice for the two cases was a conscious decision, as the 
Netherlands and Belgium have a Muslim population with a comparable size and background. However, 
it would be beneficial to test if the current analysis would still provide comparable results in countries 
where Muslim populations are not comparable and significantly different instead. 
 However, as emphasized earlier, it is worth putting time and effort into improving the position 
of Muslims and in countering discrimination. Therefore, Western countries should reflect on their own 
society in order to understand the threat of radicalization and terrorism that they are exposed to, 
especially in times when populism is thriving and polarization is growing.  
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